Nuclear Safeguards Bill [Lords] — 10 Apr 2000
Order for Second Reading read.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Bill will provide the Government with the necessary powers to implement a strengthened nuclear safeguards system in the United Kingdom by bringing into effect an additional protocol to our existing nuclear safeguards agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency. That will fulfil the UK's commitment to help to strengthen the effectiveness of the international system for detecting clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapons states.
The cost to small businesses involved in manufacturing or consultancy work which would be caught by the proposed legislation would be in the order of a few thousand pounds per year.--[ Official Report, House of Lords , 30 November 1999; Vol. 607, c. 777.]
The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give such supplementary particulars as may be so specified.
the courts should be able to decide for themselves whether that inconsistency--
was relevant to any offence with which a person was charged under the Bill--[ Official Report, House of Lords , 24 January 2000; Vol. 608, c. 1349.]
So far, the rate of signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols has been abysmal. For Britain to have ratified before the 2000 NPT conference would be an important signal of its commitment to strengthening the safeguards regime and improving the IAEA powers for monitoring and inspecting nuclear capable states.
It was agreed by the Council of Ministers on 8 June 1998 and approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 11 June. The Additional Protocol was signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998.
of the desire of the international community--
to further enhance--
a split infinitive appears even in the preamble of an allegedly important document--
nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.
Right now, as we sit here in Westminster in March of the millennium year, the United States and Russia are in stalemate. The prospective adoption by the United States of a "Star Wars" missile defence system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and lead to a more confrontational military posture between the US and Russia, and the US and China.
These three treaties--the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--underpin the current arms control regime. They are in danger of coming apart at a time when more material for making weapons of mass destruction is available worldwide than ever before.
There is still the possibility for these three treaties to be saved, and for a return to progress on multi-lateral nuclear disarmament. But it will require leadership. Britain is uniquely placed to assume this leadership role: strong influence is required in Washington, and as a result of the special relationship between our two countries, the influence of the British is particularly strong.
The United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (i) . . . below.
A general description of and information specifying the location of those nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the United Kingdom.
nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities
The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in article 2--
however, the Agency shall have access to--
the article then gives a list, including
Any location referred to in Article 5.c.
Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling
the United Kingdom shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.
adjacent locations or through other means.
shall give the United Kingdom . . . advance notice of access of at least 24 hours.
at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours.
Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access.
Unless otherwise agreed to by the United Kingdom, access shall only take place during regular working hours.
The United Kingdom, or for access under article 5.a. or otherwise involving nuclear material, the United Kingdom and the Community, shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their access by representatives of the United Kingdom.
provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
Upon request by the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom and the Agency shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol to prevent the dissemination--
of proliferation sensitive information . . . to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information.
shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information.
Unless the Community or the United Kingdom advises the Director General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the United Kingdom within three months of . . . the Board's approval, the inspector so notified . . . shall be considered designated.
The United Kingdom shall . . . provide the designated inspector specified--
with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of the United Kingdom.
Any visas . . . shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest.
No obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on disclosure . . . prevents a person voluntarily giving information to the Secretary of State if that person has reason to believe that it is Additional Protocol information.
whether imposed by statute or otherwise.
The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give such supplementary particulars as may be so specified.
the powers of an authorised officer who enters premises under the authority of a warrant under this section
to require any information which is held in electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be reproduced in a form in which he can read and copy it
A constable who enters premises
The agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
in any proceedings any question arises whether a person at any time when purporting to exercise powers under this section was or was not an Agency inspector, a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relevant to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
If in any proceedings any question arises?
The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:
(a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2.05 x 10 9 N/m 2 (300,000 psi) or more.
The powers of an authorised officer who enters premises . . .
to take with him such other persons and such equipment as appear to him to be necessary . . .
An Act of Parliament is presumed not to bind the Crown unless the contrary intention is clearly stated, or there is a necessary implication that the Crown is to be bound . . . Crown immunity is being . . . reduced, as legislative opportunities arise.--[ Official Report , 22 June 1995; Vol. 262, c. 376W.]
No constable shall, by virtue of subsection (6)(b), search a person of the opposite sex.
The United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with access to . . . Any place in a facility or part thereof in the United Kingdom designated pursuant to Article 78(a) of the Safeguards Agreement
Any location identified under Article 2.
Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling.
For access in accordance with Article 5.c., collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency
pursuant to Article 5.c. utilization at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the United Kingdom and, as appropriate, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.
The United Kingdom shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas.
The Secretary of State may serve a notice on any person requiring him to give the Secretary of State information, or information of a description, specified in the notice.
make regulations requiring persons of any description specified in the regulations to inform him that they are of such a description and to give supplementary particulars.
The powers of an authorised officer who enters premises under the authority of a warrant under this section include power--
(a) to take with him such other persons and such equipment as appear to him to be necessary.
A constable who enters premises under the authority of a warrant.
require any information which is held in electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which he can read and copy it.
Let us suppose that the information is encrypted, and that the person who holds it claims to have lost his key. Under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill, that person will receive an automatic two-year sentence for not producing the encrypted material--
I understand that it is the priority of all the members of Euratom to ratify as soon as possible. This requires all members to ensure that they have amended their domestic legislation appropriately.--[ Official Report, House of Lords , 30 November 1999; Vol. 607, c. 782.]
Question put, That the Question be now put:--
The House divided: Ayes 219, Noes 13.
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